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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-4573
___________
RODNEY SMITH,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 1:14-cv-00763)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 28, 2015
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 8, 2015)
_________
OPINION*
_________

PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Rodney Smith seeks this Court’s review of the District Court’s
dismissal of his petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Because his appeal presents

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
In February 2008, Smith was convicted in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania of two counts of possession of a firearm and ammunition
by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced under 18
U.S.C. § 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Based on his total offense
level of 40 and his Category VI criminal history, Smith’s sentencing range under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines was 360 months’ to life imprisonment. The District Court
sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release. This
Court affirmed Smith’s conviction and sentence. See United States v. Smith, 362 F.
App’x 297 (3d Cir. 2010).
Smith thereafter filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence, arguing
that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel due to several alleged
errors concerning the application of the ACCA to enhance his sentence. He alleged, in
part, that his attorney failed to object to the use of a 1980 state-court drug conviction at
sentencing. The District Court denied Smith’s motion on the merits, and we declined to
issue a certificate of appealability. (See C.A. No. 12-3281.)
On April 1, 2014, we denied Smith’s request to file a second or successive § 2255
motion, in which he sought to vacate his sentence. He argued that his 1980 conviction
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did not qualify as a “serious drug offense” that qualified him as a career offender under
the ACCA based on the recent Supreme Court decision in Descamps v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), and our decision in United States v. Tucker, 703 F.3d 205 (3d
Cir. 2012). (C.A. No. 14-1382.) In Descamps, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that courts
may not apply the “modified” categorical approach to sentencing under the ACCA when
the crime at issue has a single, indivisible set of elements. 133 S. Ct. at 2281-82. And in
Tucker, we applied the modified categorical approach in holding that the appellant’s prior
state conviction for conspiracy to sell drugs was not a serious drug offense within the
meaning of the ACCA. 703 F.3d at 214.
Smith then filed the current § 2241 petition in his district of confinement, again
asserting that his sentence should be vacated under Descamps and Tucker. The District
Court determined that § 2241 was not the proper vehicle for Smith’s claim, and dismissed
the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Smith now appeals.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review
over the district court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its
factual findings.” Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002)
(per curiam). We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order if there is no
substantial question presented in the appeal. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
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We find no error in the District Court’s dismissal of Smith’s petition, as it is
apparent that his claim is not viable under § 2241. A motion filed under 28 U.S.C. §
2255 is the presumptive means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a
conviction or sentence. See Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002).
In limited circumstances, a federal prisoner can seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if the
remedy provided by § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his or her
detention. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249-51 (3d Cir. 1997).
This occurs “only where the petitioner demonstrates that some limitation of scope of
procedure would prevent” the petitioner from receiving adequate adjudication of his or
her claims. Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538. We have thus far applied this “safety valve” in the
rare situation where a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to challenge his conviction
because an intervening change of the law decriminalized the conduct underlying the
conviction. Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120 (citing In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251).
As noted above, Smith claims that his sentence was wrongly enhanced under the
ACCA because the sentencing court erroneously determined that a prior state-court drug
conviction was a “serious drug offense,” and thus that he is factually innocent of being a
career offender. Smith asserts that he could not have brought this claim previously
because Descamps created a new rule of substantive law in 2013. He is incorrect. In
Descamps, the Court reaffirmed that its existing precedent permits application of the
modified categorical approach for determining whether a prior conviction constitutes a
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“violent felony” under the ACCA only when a statute is divisible, and then only to
determine the subpart under which the defendant was convicted. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at
2282-86. Thus, “[t]he Supreme Court . . . explained that it was not announcing a new
rule, but was simply reaffirming the Taylor [v. United States, 495 U.S. 575
(1990)]/Shepard [v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005)] approach, which some courts had
misconstrued.” United States v. Davis, 751 F.3d 769, 775 (6th Cir. 2014). Indeed, we
already have decided that Descamps does not alter our ruling in Tucker that 35 Pa. Stat. §
780-113(a)(30), which is the statute under which Smith was convicted in 1980, is
divisible and properly subject to the modified categorical approach. See United States v.
Abbott, 748 F.3d 154, 156 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2014). And Tucker itself, which was based on
the particular record of conviction before the District Court in that case, shows that Smith
could have raised arguments regarding application of the modified categorical approach
to his statute of conviction before Descamps. Descamps does not constitute the rare
situation of an intervening change of the law sufficient to apply the “safety valve”
provided by § 2241. See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120.
Further, Descamps applied principles that Smith could have raised as early as in
his direct appeal. And he did, in fact, set forth claims based on Descamps in his recent
application to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. His lack of success on his
challenges to his sentence does not render § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective,” or make
reliance on § 2241 appropriate. See Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251; Queen v. Miner, 530
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F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (affirming district court’s dismissal of § 2241
petition where the issues raised had been, or could have been, decided in a prisoner’s
previous habeas action). Accordingly, relief is not available to Smith under 28 U.S.C. §
2241.
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. We deny Smith’s
motion for appointment of counsel.
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